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SPEEQI  BY  TilE  RIGHT  HON  ROY  JENKINS,  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  COMMISSION 
OF  THE  EUROPEA.i\i  COMMUNITIES  TO  THE  OVERSEAS  BA!\lKERS'  CLUB  -
MONDAY  6  FEBRUARY  1978  - GUILDHALL 
In replying to the toast to the guests this evening,  I 
should like to speak to you  about  a  single major  theme,  namely  the 
problem of international monetary  stability and  the potential role 
of the European Community  in sustaining it.  This  is, I  accept, a 
solenm  enough  subject at the present time,  but. I  hope  it will not be 
too  solenm  for an  after-dinner speech.  But  first, let me  say  how 
delighted I  am  to be  here.  I  am  most  grateful to the Overseas 
Bankers'  Club  for inviting me  and  happy  that the occasion  takes place 
in Guildhall.  I  have  naturally spoken here on  a number  of occasions 
before as a British Chancellor or Home  Secretary.  But  those occasions 
were  in a  sense normal  and  expected.  To  be  here  as  President of the 
European  Commission  is far from  being  an  automatic honour  ru1d  therefore 
all the more  welcome. 
It is from  that perspective,  the perspective of a  Community  · 
of 260  million people  responsible for  40  per cent of the world's  trade 
that I  should like to talk to you  both about  the historical  s~tting 
and  the future prospects for the international monetary  system. 
The  historical position is clear enough.  At  Bretton Woods 
thirty-four years  ago  a  system was  set up  by  which  the dollar became 
the anchor currency of the world.  At  that time  other countries undertook 
the obligation to support their own  currencies so that they did not 
fluctuate,  except within narrow  and  defined  limits, against the dollar. 
The  United States did not have  this obligation.  Its responsibility was  the 
wider one  of maintaining the only· currency still linked to gold and  of 
being at least theoreticallx willing to pay  out gold for dollars when-
ever other countries asked  for this.  There  were,  of course,  alternative 
systems  available- the United States could have  accepted Keynes'  plan 
of 1944  for a world  clearing union.  But  the United States chose 
othen'iise.  With  the perspective of history,  I  believe that this 1-vas 
a  decision which  provided the world with a  system which  worked,  not 
perfectly of course  but on  the whole  very successfully for a  generation. 
It was  the fastest period of trade  ru1d  income  grmvth  in history. 
But  as  we  know,  the dollar anchor  began  to drag  against the 
stream not only of international monetary  and  economic  fluctuations 
but of internal American  docmstic  problems.  The  strain became  too 
/great even -2-
great  even for a  currency backed by the vast  resources of the  Jl..rnerican 
economy.  It bec;an to suffer from  some  of the pressures of over-
commitment  which had afflicted sterling  in  the early post-\•la.r 
years.  The  1968  gold crisis becan  a  series of troubles for the dollar 
which gathered momentum  up to the autu1nn  of 1969  and then paused,  but 
only briefly before the  system finally cracked in 1971.  In part the 
very success of the system contained the seeds of its own  gradual 
collapse.  First,  the ove.n·1helming  role of the dollar failed to reflect 
either the shift in the balance of economic  pov1er  v.;hich  followed  from 
the success of the Community of Six  in the  'sixties,  or the  incr·easing-
dec;ree of economic  interdependence in the 'tJOrld  as  a  r1hole  t.;hich  h;;,d 
resulted  fro~ the openness  and expansion of trade.  Second,  such an 
expanding trade environment  needed greatly increased liquidity and our 
inability to tackle this problem in a  reasonably orderly fashion  me~~t that 
we  had to rely on the creation of the "overhang"  problem of the dollar 
of which we  are all a\'lare. 
The  oil price crisis of 1973  therefore  struck a.t  an  international 
monetary system that \'tas  already vulnerable.  Admittedly,  the 
transitional period from  1968/69  onwards  he,d  led to  a  reversion fro:n 
Bretton Hoods to the pre-Ha.r mechanism of floatinc exchange  rates, 
which certainly had its disadvanta,ses but to many  seemed  rea~istic  ?~d 
indeed inevitable.  In this wcy the  system  ~-Tas  able to  some  extent 
to cope with the backlog of fine  .. ncial adjustment  tha.t  had piled up,  and 
with the sharply diverc:ent  inflation 'rates  and policy responses vthich 
followed the oil crisis.  Since the  shocks of 1971  and 1973/4 •,;o  have 
moved into  a  more fragile  and volatile international monetary envirol:".:nent. 
I  do not  \-Iant  to  over-d.ramatise the point.  If He  look back on  soHe 
of the pro.:;noses  of 1973  the utter monetary chaos ·then predictecl b;::  r;o::;.e 
has not materialised.  ~Je ):lave  successfully muddled throut:,h,  so;Jotines 
doinc our muddlinc in a,  very sophisticated ·.1a:y.  But  the problems of 
overcoming inflation,  of seeking to retun1 to  a  growth  and employment 
patt_ern  t~hich v-;e  kne\·f  in the Sixties,  of. l'e<lucint;  internn-tionaJ.  :nonotc:·.r~; 
imbalance  and of respondinc legitimately and practically to the neads 
of developinc countries  remain with us. 
The  system needs  a  more  solid international monetary bnse if ue 
are to have effective reflationary policies without  da...YJ.cerouB  cc~1sc ,,_:encr.;s. 
A relic:.nce  upon  floath:c exd!;::.nce  rates,  >'lith  the onin currE:r.cy  :?.t  lorost 
tempor2.-ril;y  \<ie<.~~enecl,  \·rill  not  in my  vi~nr be  sufficient.  L} ';  ·c  ·,. 
more 
floatinc rates  have  allo-;;ed apparently/ painless adjustments i't<;.i'1 
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hitherto possible they have also made  it too easy to escape  from  the 
financial discipline v1hich  is essential to econoraic  stability. 
dollar. 
He  need not  take too pessimistic a  vievr  about  the future of the 
It remains by far the most  powerful currency in the w·orld,  ~·:i th 
great  underlying strencth.  But it no  loneer perfonns the almost  effortless 
soltl.r role,  l'lith a  \'!ell-ordered planetary system around it, \:hich \vas  its 
characteristic of the the  'forties,  'fifties and early  'sixties.  It is, 
however,  still the only real medium  of interna·tional  exchal1£e that He 
have.  It remains  a  sun but uithout quite the old kinetic enero·,  an0 
without the ackno'l-llede;ed  responsibility or the pre-ordained cert  aint;:  of 
maintaininG a  solar system around it.  This is inherently an unstable 
syotem,  it is the reason for the  sometimes  confused and exacerbatinc 
arguments for and  ~ainst the so-called policy or non-policy of bcni£~ 
neglect.  Hhen President Carter paid his official visit to the 3uro;>ean 
Commission in early January v:e  stressed to him the importance to uorld 
monetary stability in the present half-light circumstances of a  suppor·tive 
and consistent  A:nerican policy tovtards the dollar. 
But  at the sa'Ile  time  I  put then,  and  I  put to you tonif:ht,  that  a 
European  Community  t·lhich  is the v:orld's  larc-est tradint; bloc cen not 
forever  go  on  request  inc the United States alone to ensure that all is >"Tell 
in the \'torld financial  system.  Our potential strength in Europe  and the 
role that we  can play in relation to ..timerica  and Japan on the one  hancl 
and to the third uorld on the other offers us  an opportunity to take more 
decisive action.  This is one of the  reasons "':r.y  the Commission has  soU£ht 
to redefine  and lalmch the dornant  Community  objective of economic  and 
1:1onetary union.  T'ne  move  to\·rards  a  common  Community  currency,  apart  fror:1 
its  major internal advantc.ges,  could give Lurope  a  neH  strencth to e:wrt 
a  major stabilisin£ influence in Horld r.1onetar-y  affairs. 
I  a~ often told tha{_u9 to this point the historical and  contc~porary 
analysis I  have put to you is logico.l  and sensible.  But  that  t·Te  have either 
chosen the ;;rong mo:nent  to  relaunch  such  on  idea,  or that  even if i·Je  have 
not,  we  are locked in by  an absence of political uill.  I  reject the vie•·J 
that the timing is mistaken.  The  European eco:nor,1ies  are today  im:~ol)Uiced 
in the face of unacceptably hich levels of unemployment  >·;hich  appear 
intractable in the  absence  of on;)'  ne;: historic impulse to erolv-th.  Por 
differinc reasons neither the  stronc: nor the ;:ealc  econonies see  a  11<:\tional 
route out of ·their  slu;:_;cis~mecs.  'l
111er:;e  are prccioel;;.- the  cirC'll!.lSt<>.nces  in 
Hhich \\e  need  ui  th a  conbination of ima{;incd;ion  and realima to breck out 
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from the conventional  framework.  I  am  particularly glad that this need 
had been fully recognised  by the Banking Federation of the Europeen 
Communities.  I  received at  the end of last ;.reek  a  letter to this effect 
from their President,  the  Chairman of the Dresdner  Bank.  "T'ne  Board of 
the Bankine Federation",  it began,  "met  today at Frar.kfurt-on-I.:Lain to col)s:i,der 
your ar.d  the European Commission's efforts towards  economic  and monetary 
W'lion.  It  >'las  agreed that your efforts  ~d  endeavours  should be supported 
as  stroncly as possible by the banking quarters of this Community,  and the 
Board feels  a  need to inform the public of its position".  At  the  same  time~. 
argume.nts 
we  must  be prepared to face  and anst-rer  the  ahrays superficially persuasive/ 
for cleaving close to the status auo. 
Let me  briefly mention three of them.  First, there is an  argume~l 
\'Thich  s~s that  a  Community  of Nine \Jhich for essential political reasons, 
is ready to embrace the prospect of enlargement to  ~:elve,  cannot possibly 
at the  same  time contemplate  a  decisive step towards greater integration. 
I  turn this arbUffient  on its head for two  reasons.  First,  I  believe that 
the prospect of enlargement  strengthens the case.  It can only take pJ,.ace 
without  a  debilitating consequence  for what  we  have  already created if 
the essential cohesive  frame\·1ork . is strengthened.  Second,  I  do not  accept 
the argtUllent  v1hich  is sometimes  advanced that to sustain an elfective 
monetary union you need an  equality of economic  performance in different 
parts of the union.  T'nat  has not been true of monetary unions in the past, 
and it need not be true of one  in Europe.  If tve  t-za.it  for a  time l'lhen · 
the standard of living of Hamburg is the same_ as Naples  or of Copennq:en 
as  Lisbon,  t-re  shall Hait  for ever.  Certainly a  monetary union tvill involve 
stron[; co!!l!D.on  disciplines.  But it Hill neither of itself ensure,  nor 
needs to be sustained by,  a  completely balanced regional distribution of 
income.  The United States of America has proved that. 
There is a  second argument  against  action which says that either 
only the strong econonies,  or alterne.tively only the weak,  l-lould benefit 
from  such a  union.  1Jeither is true.  It \'muld not be sensible to propose 
an  advance which cave exclusive  adv~tages only to either the stronc or 
the 1-1eclc.  He  t-lill never move  foruard on  such a  basis.  But that is in no ltay 
the case here.  There is mutual advantac;e.  The  stronc have  ~  over-
whelminG  interest in underpilminc the rmi  ty of the European market. 
This becomes the more  imperative  as lmrld competitive conditions beco1ae 
more  dif:ficul  t  for  even the strongest of the member  states.  Equally 
the vreaker states of the  Community  greatly need the sustenance  and 
/the discipline the discipline of tighter integration, provided  ~hat they get 
adequate  support in the process.  That  can be  done,  with an 
increase in the transfer of resources,  but without anything comparable 
to the sums  involved in national states or even  in existing 
federations. 
This  brings me  to the third and  last objection I will mention 
to you  tonight.  That  is, that national governments  will never be 
prepared to give up  the powers  that they have  over monetary policy 
or exchange  rates.  My  response  to this is that on  the whole  that is 
a  false problem based  on  a  false perspective.  The  influence that 
individual European  governments  have  on  these matters  is already greatly 
limited by  external circumstances,  over which  they constantly proclaim 
their lack of control.  The  powers  are largely illusory.  The  real 
question about powers  should not in my  view  be  locked  into a  theological 
debate  about  their extent, but  into a  real discussion about  the balance 
of advantage of Europe  acting together.  And  I  would  add  that if an 
external constraint is to be  placed on  any  individual nation,  is it 
not better that it grows  out of an  institutional arrangement  formed 
from  a  group  of economies  that have  already come  together for their 
common  purpose  and  in their common  interest. 
I  therefore put it to you  that since no  individual European 
country can expect to influence world  financial stability, on  its own, 
in a  long  term  beneficial way,  and  as  it is unreasonable as well as  .  .  . 
unrealistic to expect  the United States to bear alone  this burden as 
it has  in the past, we  should not merely pay  lip-service to, but grasp 
the nettle of economic  and  monetary  union.  It can be  greatly for our 
own  good  in the Community  and  for that of the world as  a whole. 
Thank  you  for your hospitality tonight.  For  an  Englishman  of 
Welsh  origins and  who  is also* a  Freeman  of the City who  now  spends  most 
of his time  abroad,  it is a  source of pride that an  occasion of such 
impressiveness  can  take place here  in GuildhalL  It is at once  a  symbol  of the 
historic tradition of the City and  of the modern  vitality of London 
as  an  international banking  centre.  Long  may  they both continue.  I 
thank  you  most  warmly  on  behalf of all the guests  for your hospitality 
and  welcome  this evening. 
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